historians have also brought to the fore the rather more gradual evolution of other European systems (Levine 1988; Baldwin 1990; Mitchell 1991) and their influence on American reformers (Rodgers 1998) . For decades after establishment of the German system, and soon thereafter the Austrian system, voluntarism remained the byword of other countries' social insurance programs. Eventually, for reasons political and economic, government took over an ever larger role in insurance provision. One problem faced by countries without mandated insurance was the tendency of the chronically sick to form a disproportionate share of the insured. In Europe, this problem was resolved by enlarging the risk pool through government provision of health services or mandatory health insurance for the entire population (Murray 2005) .
Perhaps the greatest question in the American case has been why a corresponding growth in government responsibilities did not occur. The lack of government insurance has been of steady interest to historians and historically minded social scientists. Ronald L. Numbers (1978) , still not surpassed in incisiveness, examined the gradual emergence of physicians as effective opponents of insurance reform. Roy Lubove (1986) considered efforts in both the Progressive and New Deal eras to expand government social insurance. He concluded that an important obstacle was the cultural tendency of Americans to rely on voluntarism, as Alexis de Tocqueville first noted. More recently, Beatrix Hoffman (2001) analyzed the eventual failure of government insurance proposals in Progressive Era New York, where the state senate passed an insurance bill only to see it bottled up in the house. Colin Gordon (2003) , Jennifer Klein (2003) , Alan Derickson (2005) , and Jill Quadagno (2005) review and lament missed opportunities for government health insurance over the course of the twentieth century. Economic and social histories have suggested both the viability of alternative sources of insurance (Emery and Emery 1999; Beito 2000; Murray forthcoming) and, as in Europe, the inescapable problem of selection bias that faced voluntary insurers (Thomasson 2004) .
Particularly for workers in the past, the inability to work due to illness or injury reduced income drastically just when expenditures on medical goods and services increased sharply. Since adverse health events are random and were thought to be difficult to save against, a widespread response has been to pool payments into a fund that would distribute benefits to fund members and/or their physicians when they become sick and unable to work. That has been the essence of health insurance. Even this thumbnail sketch hints at the difficulties involved in creating an insurance scheme and maintaining it as an ongoing concern: how to determine the level of benefits that will keep workers at their posts until they are ''really'' sick or that will keep physicians from prescribing ''too much'' medicine. How did such benefits influence sickness behavior? How big should the risk pool be? Shall it contain workers at one company, members of a fraternal group or a union, or all citizens of a country? If the state does not provide medical care or insurance to all its citizens, will the poor lack such insurance, and more to the point, will they obtain sufficient medical care?
This issue of Social Science History is dedicated to studying questions such as these in case studies of the United States, England, and South Africa from the late nineteenth century to the second half of the twentieth century. Particularly in the United States, where government involvement in health insurance is extensive in absolute terms but still less than universal as in so many other industrial democracies, it is reasonable to expect that the question of how far the government should go in providing coverage to its citizens will remain a live issue for years to come. Witness the advent of Medicare D, through which the federal government assumes much of the cost of prescription drugs for elderly Americans.
Nor is the question of government provision limited to Europe and North America; it seems to be a universal issue in countries that have reached a certain degree of prosperity. For example, from the early 1950s health insurance coverage in Taiwan expanded from a base of employed workers, including, as this issue notes in the case of South Africa, government workers in particular, to universal coverage that included families, the unemployed, and those not in the labor force from 1995 (Hye Kyung Son 2001). Although government activity in health insurance markets has tended to expand along with economic growth, the systems that result can still display particular shortcomings. While government-run health insurance programs may theoretically increase the availability of health care services, making those services free typically generates greater demand for them than the system can easily handle. As a result, queues form to get in to see the doctor or be treated in the hospital. Long waiting times between the onset of ill health and medical attention or from diagnosis to treatment may raise questions about allocative inefficiencies in a government-run insurance program (Guaraglia and Rossi 2004) . In short, regardless of provider, a variety of problems of efficiency and equity inhere in the provision of health insurance today.
Has it always been so? This issue looks to the past for some hints at answering a series of important and unavoidable questions regarding health insurance. We look to the past for several reasons. One is the sheer variety of sources of insurance in the past: fraternal societies, trade unions, employers, independent benefit societies, and commercial insurers. In the United States, the federal government began operating compulsory health insurance for a very narrowly defined class of workers-merchant sailors-in 1798 (Terris 1944) , but over most of the period in question, workers who wanted to protect their incomes against incapacitation due to ill health sought private insurance. 1 In Europe, sickness funds for miners long predated more general sickness insurance for industrial workers (Neill 1911) .
By restricting our perspective to the past, we may obtain clearer distinctions regarding the importance of culture, economics, and race. Relationships between worker, employer, insurer, and physician in the past were much less mediated by medical technology-highly specialized machines, medicines, and surgical techniques-than in the present. Since one of the factors behind Americans' increasing expenditures on health care today is the often astounding sophistication of medical technology, considering a period when simple rest was a critical element of most courses of therapy should draw out the effects of human decision making as well as structural impediments to improved access to health care.
In late-nineteenth-century America, ''sickness'' insurance, as it was often called, consisted primarily of sick pay benefits. 2 Workers contributed a small amount into a fund every week and in return were promised around half of their regular pay if they became incapacitated. Typically, they had to wait a few days after claiming benefits to receive them, a strategy that kept sickness funds from paying for transient conditions. Nearly all funds required the insured worker to get a physician to confirm his or her disability claim. Some insurance funds paid for the physician themselves, while others expected the claimant to pay the physician out of his or her sick pay. Very few funds offered medical attention to workers who were not about to miss at least week of work, nor did families typically enjoy medical attention. Some funds did send out helpers to stay with the sick member and assist with daily duties around the house ( Jenney 1895) .
In early-twentieth-century America, surveys indicated that about a third of industrial workers carried some form of health insurance (Lubove 1986: 73-75) . In the United States and Britain alike, the most important source of such insurance was fraternal societies. In Illinois in 1919, about as many wage earners were covered by fraternals as by company and trade union sickness funds combined (Beye 1919: 109-22) . Similar shares obtained in Pennsylvania (Beidelman 1919: 158) . Even before the creation of national health insurance in 1911, perhaps two-thirds of British workingmen obtained some degree of income security through their friendly society or other source (Riley 1997: 30) . American fraternal insurance was particularly popular among married men with families-precisely those who stood to lose the most from prolonged illness (Whaples and Buffum 1991) . However, few fraternals were racially integrated. Ironically, one example was the Improved Order of Red Men, whose constitution excluded actual Indians from membership (Beito 2000: 45-46) . Despite such barriers, African Americans were occasionally able to surmount considerable obstacles and begin such societies themselves, even to the point of operating insurance programs and providing medical care through hospitals (ibid.: 182-91).
While the existence of fraternal health insurance is well known, how well they were run has been the subject of debate. Did fraternals cease to offer sickness insurance benefits because they operated their funds ineptly? In a recent book, Jason Kaufman (2002: 47) described fraternal insurance finances as a classic Ponzi scheme in which dues from new members went more or less directly to pay benefits to older and sicker members. The only hope for younger members to obtain benefits in the future was for them to recruit even more young and healthy members, who would then have even lower probabilities of ever collecting on their promised benefits. This view seems much too harsh. To the extent that ''instability'' is a quantitative claim, the evidence amassed by George Emery and J. C. Herbert Emery (1999) showed that, by reasonable actuarial standards, fraternal sickness funds were sound. On the specific topic of setting premium and benefit rates, Emery (1996) reported that fraternal insurance was, in general, prudently managed with premiums priced at a reasonable rate and that they formed an overall system characterized by stability.
If fraternal insurance was a going concern, why did fraternals ultimately leave the health insurance business? J. C. Herbert Emery's article in this issue explains how fraternal ideology changed over time, led in part by the ability of older members to build up their financial savings. Consequently, these members lost interest in dedicating a potentially large share of lodge finances to insurance. Emery's argument that fraternal members could save out of their incomes against financial loss due to illness is a powerful challenge to the conventional wisdom regarding Progressive Era reformers' claims.
Even if prudential common sense, hard-won experience, and rules of thumb were adequate substitutes for sophisticated actuarial mathematics in managing insurance funds in the past, that is not to underestimate the range of incentive conflicts that lay behind a seemingly simple insurance contract. These complexities grew with the increasing ability of medical personnel to diagnose and cure patients or to ameliorate chronic conditions. The source of these conflicts was relatively straightforward; they stemmed from differences in knowledge of the worker's ''true'' health status on the worker's own part versus that on the insurer's part, combined with the lack of sharp distinctions between ''sick but well enough to work'' and ''too sick to work.'' Together these conferred considerable autonomy upon the worker to decide if he or she could not work, subject to fulfilling the insurer's requirements to obtain physician approval for benefits. But these problems were overshadowed by the closely related and difficult question ''What is the purpose of health insurance?'' The simple answer c. 1900 was to keep a sick worker's family out of the poorhouse-hence the emphasis on sick pay benefits. Hopes that health insurance could do more than this complicate the picture considerably, thanks to the autonomy of the policyholder in light of ambiguous standards of sickness. Beatrix Hoffman's article in this issue explores subtle issues regarding this question later on in the twentieth century. Over time the importance of medical benefits grew, and sick pay benefits gradually became subsumed under collective bargaining agreements for the unionized and broader benefit packages for other workers. The lack of a clear answer to the question ''why health insurance?'' enmeshed insurers and insured alike in complex problems of worker motivation and insurance purposes.Was the purpose of health insurance to enable a worker or family member to obtain all the medical care he or she could possibly want virtually for free? This was one possible goal, but it is easy to see how it would lead to patients consuming nearly worthless medical care if they did not have to pay for it. To prevent this from happening, some insurers imposed charges on their policyholders that, they hoped, would discourage the consumption of nearly worthless medical care. But was ''nearly worthless'' in the eyes of the patient or the insurer? In an example from the present, Allison B. Rosen et al. (2005) have shown that reducing co-payments for ACE inhibitors taken by elderly diabetics would result in far fewer renal and cardiac complications later on. To view this result another way, the required co-payments effectively reduce the demand for a clinically effective medicine, and as a result of skipping their medications, the health of these patients declines rather sharply. Hoffman shows that such conflicts predate present insurance arrangements by decades. Is a happy medium possible, in which a reasonable amount of resources (somehow defined) is expended to produce a reasonable amount of health (somehow defined)?
If insurance protects the purchaser from consequences of an adverse event, it stands to reason that those most interested in purchasing insurance are those most likely to experience the adverse event. Thus life insurance might have particular appeal to the elderly, marine insurance to shipowners whose vessels sail through iceberg-filled seas, or fire insurance to the owner of a building next door to a gasoline depot. Economists refer to this phenomenon as adverse selection, and it appears in health insurance markets as the tendency of people who expect to make claims, possibly due to chronic conditions, to be more likely than others to buy insurance. Insurers, in turn, try to screen out high-risk policyholders, but they may not always be successful (Thomasson 2004) . If their risk pool consists disproportionately of people in ill health, soon premiums may not suffice to cover benefit payments, leading to financial crisis (Murray 2005) .
The very act of insuring creates an incentive to reduce efforts to avoid the adverse event, on the one hand, or to make dubious claims, on the other. This phenomenon, known as moral hazard, may be familiar from depictions in popular culture, such as Billy Wilder's film The Fortune Cookie (1966) , in which the slightly injured Jack Lemmon and his lawyer, Walter Matthau, scheme to extract damages from an insurer far out of proportion to Lemmon's injuries. In real life, moral hazard can complicate insurers' efforts to plan for the future in actuarially sound fashion. When American insurance companies first tried to set group health premiums and benefits in the early twentieth century, they relied on the only actuarial tables available, from the Manchester Union fraternal society in Great Britain. Unfortunately, the Manchester Union actuaries had failed to take moral hazard into account, which proved to be the best explanation for a puzzling increase in morbidity rates. As a result, American insurers lost considerable sums through underestimating the demand for benefits (Cammack 1921: 279) . The presence of adverse selection and moral hazard thus complicates the task of health insurance considerably. Although its purpose is to enable sick people to obtain medical care, can those patients be made to consume the ''correct'' amount of medicine and medical care? But correct by what standard?
A policy of voluntary health insurance coverage raises questions about the availability of insurance to all who would like to obtain it. If the proportion of covered people varies by identifiable characteristics, why some groups might be more likely to enjoy coverage and others less likely to do so becomes an important question. In the United States, such questions are inextricably tied up with race. Melissa A. Thomasson's article here considers the seemingly constant pattern over the last half century in which African Americans were much less likely than others to enjoy health insurance coverage. Regarding this differential at midcentury, she explores possible connections to lower black income and education levels as well as demographic and family structure differences. Combined with differential employment rates in particular occupations and industries, her models explain about half the difference in insurance rates by race, leaving a substantial amount to be explained. She completes the picture by connecting racial differences in insurance rates to racial differences in consumption of health care services.
Racial differentials in health and in access to health care services are not new. The most obvious consequence of custom and Jim Crow laws in the United States was separate and clearly unequal access by race to all manner of facilities. Where black access could be restricted to hospitals, clinics, and insurers, blacks typically endured inferior or nonexistent health care. 3 But exclusion from white facilities did not always mean a complete lack of access to health care. David T. Beito and Linda Royster Beito narrate the history of the Afro-American Sons and Daughters (AASD) Hospital in Yazoo City, Mississippi, showing how one particular fraternal health service operated. Two entrepreneurial African Americans, one a real estate developer and financier, the other a physician, observed firsthand that white institutions were uninterested in providing health care services to blacks. In response, they built their own hospital, a complex project that required endless fundraising efforts and assumption of considerable risk in financing the project. Once under way, the AASD hospital benefited, ironically, from neglect by state regulators, which gave the hospital a greater degree of flexibility in finances and in medical practice. This article thus offers both a case study of insurance and health care provision through fraternal societies at a time when fraternals remained an important source of health care financing and a particular story of achievement despite substantial legal obstacles.
An important goal of this issue is to introduce analyses conducted by historians outside the United States and connect them to common issues raised in the American context while noting distinctive contrasts. 4 Recall the difficulty facing insurance funds that tried to anticipate the future claims activities of its members in an actuarially sound way. To maintain financial stability, insurance funds needed to be able to forecast sickness patterns. How to define sickness, and where the line lay between sick but able to work and too sick to work, was not at all clear. These notions may vary across cultures and generations and indeed may be shifted substantially by the introduction of health insurance itself. For a preliminary understanding of patterns in sickness behavior, the detailed records of British friendly societies are indispensable (Riley 1997) . Here, Martin Gorsky, Bernard Harris, and Andrew Hinde address two distinct but related questions concerning the effects of age on health. Clearly, people tend to spend more time in ill health as they age, a pattern unlikely to have changed much over time-but how is that time in ill health distributed? Claims for sickness benefits by men in the Hampshire Friendly Society in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries indicated that they did not become sick more often as they aged but that sickness episodes tended to last longer. The lack of cohort effects in their sample suggests that this pattern may have held over a much longer period than just the one they are able to consider with their sample.
Gorsky, Harris, and Hinde also illustrate the usefulness of health insurance data to address questions related to longevity. The relationship of earlylife health to later-life health is one of the most active research fields in all of health-related social sciences. Some researchers posit connections from conditions in early adulthood to midlife health (Case et al. 2005) , and others go further back to claim that prenatal conditions influence later-life mortality risk (Barker 1992) . Gorsky, Harris, and Hinde consider effects of midlife health, as defined by the tendency to claim sickness benefits, on laterlife mortality risk. The relationship suggests an important policy motivation behind attempts to expand health insurance coverage where it is not already universal: if health insurance leads to better access to health care, which leads to better health during one's working years, then more coverage may lead to longer lives. But that depends on the complex relationships among health insurance, health care, and health status (Cameron et al. 1988; Gilleskie 1998) .
A century ago fraternal or friendly societies and other sources such as employers or unions provided most of the health insurance available in the English-speaking world. Now the most important providers are large government agencies and private insurance companies. How did the transformation from relatively small insurance funds to large public and private insurance operations occur? Grietjie Verhoef 's close study of one fund in South Africa, the Civil Servants Medical Benefit Association (CSMBA), explores the choices made by its managers at different stages of development as well as the movement by the government to pressure such funds to expand their offerings. Dalliances with private insurers that promised to provide the best of both worlds-a friendly society based on personal relationships combined with the actuarial stability of professional insurance companiesended inconclusively. The eventual development of the CSMBA into a compulsory insurer of civil servants may have hastened the loss of advantages of small funds that could more easily monitor beneficiaries. The financial difficulties that led the fund to seek and obtain government subsidies indicate that compulsory insurance is not necessarily a cure for the financial problems brought on by adverse selection in voluntary insurance. The historical literature is rich in studies of the politics behind the establishment, co-option, or rejection of universalist government health insurance or health services provision. The literature has, however, tended to skimp on close studies of how sickness insurance in the past actually worked, how extensively insurers protected their members from financial ruin, and how coverage might have influenced workers' physical health. The essays in this issue emphasize those on-the-ground effects of health insurance while not overlooking or dismissing the importance of such political studies, especially outside the orbit of the North Atlantic economies. Indeed, these essays bring analysis of both ''health'' and ''insurance'' back into debates over state provision of health insurance. In the United States at least, those debates will persist for the foreseeable future and will need to consider the issues raised here regarding the dilemma of funding health insurance and the conflicting incentives it creates.
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1
Regarding early-twentieth-century American efforts to create government health insurance, see Hoffman 2001 and Numbers 1978. 2 The terms sickness and health insurance are used interchangeably in this issue to describe the same basic insurance contract. Before Progressive efforts of the later 1910s to create state-level government insurance programs in the United States, the most common term was sickness or occasionally workingman's insurance. During the Great War, American activists hoped to substitute the term health insurance, used by the British to describe their system, for sickness insurance, the term used in Germany (Numbers 1978: 76) . 3
An exception was public goods provision, access to which could be differentiated by race only at high cost. African Americans may have benefited disproportionately from access to public water mains and sewerage construction. The history behind this is told in Troesken 2004. 4 State-led development of universal health insurance in Europe is addressed in Levine 1988; Baldwin 1990; and Rodgers 1998. 
